

fast the guideline for all philosophical questioning at the point where it arises and into which it is folded back.⁴¹ Of course, this thesis must not be taken dogmatically, but as a formulation of the fundamental problem still "veiled": can ontology be grounded ontologically or does it also need for this an *ontic* foundation, and which being must take over the function of this foundation?

437 The distinction between the being of existing Dasein and the being of beings unlike Dasein (for example, objective presence) may seem to be illuminating, but it is only the *point of departure* for the ontological problematic; it is nothing with which philosophy can rest and be satisfied. We have long known that ancient ontology deals with "reified concepts" and that the danger exists of "reifying consciousness." But what does reifying mean? Where does it arise from? Why is being "initially" "conceived" in terms of what is objectively present, and not in terms of things at hand that do, after all, lie still nearer to us? Why does this reification come to dominate again and again? How is the being of "consciousness" positively structured so that reification remains inappropriate to it? Is the "distinction" between "consciousness" and "thing" sufficient at all for a primordial unfolding of the ontological problematic? Do the answers to these questions lie along our way? And can the answer even be searched for as long as the question of the meaning of being in general remains unasked and unclarified?

We can never inquire into the origin and the possibility of the "idea" of being in general with the means of formal and logical "abstraction," that is, not without a secure horizon for questions and answers. We must look for a way† to illuminate the fundamental ontological question and follow it. Whether that way is at all the only one or even the right one can be decided only after we have followed it. The conflict with respect to the interpretation of being cannot be settled because it has not yet even been kindled. In the end, one cannot just "rush into" this conflict; rather, igniting this conflict already requires a preparation. It cannot be "jumped into," but the beginning of the strife already needs preparation. This investigation is solely undertaken to that. Where does it stand?

Something like "being" ["Sein"] has been disclosed in the understanding of being that belongs to existing Dasein as a way in which it understands. The preliminary disclosure of being, although it is unconceptual, makes it possible for Dasein as existing being-in-the-world to be related to beings, to those it encounters in the world as well as to

41. Cf. § 7.

* Thus not philosophy of existence [Existenzphilosophie]
† Not "the" sole way.

itself in existing. How is the disclosive understanding of being belonging to Dasein possible at all? Can the question be answered by going back to the primordial constitution of being of Dasein that understands being? The existential and ontological constitution of the totality of Dasein is grounded in temporality. Accordingly, a primordial mode of temporalizing of ecstatic temporality itself must make the ecstatic project of being in general possible. How is this mode of the temporalizing of temporality to be interpreted? Is there a way leading from primordial time to the meaning of being? Does time itself reveal itself as the horizon of being?

epigram, 368

overhasty
p 368

however, this inquiring into beings and into being is the sole concern of [25] thinking, yet questioning cannot be the way to the answer that is here sought, then proper thinking is not at all consist in questioning.

And it has never consisted in that, but rather in answering. But answering was always an answering to a questioning, decisively so, that all efforts were aimed at gaining the right solution of the question.

Imaginary answering is not an answering to a question. It is rather the counter-word to the word. The word must then be heard. So what matters is hearing.

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Presumably not. But all questioning may well be a kind of hearing, and for the most part even a kind of willing-to-hear.

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Instead we let ourselves be diverted into all possible side-things. Although these do indeed offer interesting vistas, the fact that we divert our progression was confirmed by the overview you

miss altogether a strict order of thought-progression.

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SCIENTIST: In fact I do. To me the only sure approach is that of the deliberations that take place in the research of physics. This approach alone promises an insight into the essence of the modern investigation of nature and therewith an insight into the contemporary conception of the world. This conception embodies our actual thinking, so called because it grasps what is actual. We are, after all, inquiring into the essence of actual thinking. But it is also clear to me that we have long strayed from thinking. [27]

SCHOLAR: By that you surely don't want to say that we have given up thinking. You just want to once again stress that we have distanced ourselves far away from thinking as the thematic object of our conversation.

SCIENTIST: I only meant this, of course.

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GUIDE: And how does it stand with the nearness and farness that you want to assess?

SCHOLAR: Without being a mathematician, I would like to say that what nearness to and farness from an object are, is self-explanatory.

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SCHOLAR: Simply said: the varying distance between an object and an observer.

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GUIDE: I thought that, according to your own explanation, we have gotten completely away from it. How is it supposed to be standing there before us?

SCIENTIST: Thinking is clearly not a thing.

GUIDE: How do you know that? Do we know what a thing is?

SCIENTIST: Thinking is a process.

SCHOLAR: It is our own activity.

Pre-logical manifestness is a fundamental occurrence of Dasein. This fundamental occurrence is characterized by three things: bringing the binding character of things toward oneself, completion, and the unveiling of the being of beings. We are claiming that Aristotle, in tracing the λόγος back to σύνθεσις and διαίρεσις, moved in the direction of this intrinsically articulated fundamental occurrence, without having seen this structural context as such. We also recognize this fundamental occurrence in its peculiar relational character, as we shall see, as that in which the 'as' and the 'as'-structure are rooted. We have moved from λόγος to world, world grasped formally as the manifestness of beings as such as a whole, so that the question arises as to why we did not start out directly from this initially formal definition of world and then proceed directly to the interpretation of its structure, instead of choosing a detour via the λόγος. We have seen that λόγος, *ratio*, reason, is what has dominated the entire problematic of metaphysics precisely with respect to the problem of world which failed to come to light. If we wish to free ourselves from this tradition in one respect, then this does not mean somehow pushing it aside and leaving it behind us. Rather all liberation from something is genuine only when it masters and appropriates whatever it is liberating itself from. Liberation from the tradition is an ever new appropriation of its newly recognized strengths. For this major step, however, which we are convinced metaphysics must take for the future, some sort of cleverness and acumen, or philosophical discoveries we think we have made, are not sufficient. Rather if we understand anything of this task at all, then it is this: that it is possible only on the basis of a transformation of Dasein itself. We have taken two paths that serve this transformation and its preparation. In the first part of the lecture course we took the path of awakening a fundamental attunement, while in the second part we took the path of dealing with a concrete problem without relating it to the fundamental attunement. The two paths now merge, yet do so in such a way that we are not thereby forcibly bringing about a transformation of our Dasein or effecting it in any sense, but only ever preparing it—which is all that philosophy can do.

§75. The 'as a whole' as the world, and the enigmatic distinction between being and beings.

We shall summarize the state of our interpretation of the phenomenon of world anew and somewhat more concisely. We do so in order to gain a view of the unitary primordial structure of this fundamental occurrence underlying the λόγος. In understanding this originary structure of this fundamental occurrence of Dasein, we shall comprehend what is meant by the thesis that man, in the essence and ground of his Dasein, is world-forming.

only preparing, never effecting

On the one side, we have the formal analysis: World is the manifest beings as such as a whole. On the other side, our movement back from λόγος has led us to an occurrence which we characterized in three moments. Holding the binding character of things toward oneself, completion, unveiling of the being of beings. This fundamental occurrence does not effect what we refer to as *world-formation*, but belongs essentially to it. Accordingly it must be intrinsically related to world. Manifestness of beings as such as a whole must occur in it. Can this threefold fundamental occurrence be grasped in its primordial structure, in which these moments belong together as related and in the unity of their belonging together make possible what we call the manifestness of beings as such as a whole? We can indeed grasp this fundamental occurrence in a unitary primordial structure, so as to comprehend in terms of this structure how the individual moments belong together in it. This is only possible, however, by our taking our interpretation thus far even further, and not simply sticking together so-called results. We are not to construct a primordial structure of this threefold fundamental occurrence of Dasein having recourse to structures of Dasein; on the contrary: we must comprehend the inner unity of this occurrence and thereby first grant ourselves a look at the fundamental constitution of Dasein.

We can see that the pre-logical manifestness of beings has the character 'as a whole'. In every assertion, whether we know it or not, and in each case in different and changing ways, we speak out of the whole and into it. In all, this 'as a whole' does not only concern those beings we have before us, but being occupied with them, for instance; rather all those beings that are possible in each case, ourselves included, are embraced by this whole. We ourselves are comprehensively included in this 'as a whole', not in the sense of a component belonging to it that also happens to be there, but in the sense of being in each case and in possibilities belonging to the essence of Dasein itself. It is in the form of immersing ourselves in beings, or be it in the form of confronting them, going along with them, being rebuffed by them, being left out, being held in limbo, being fulfilled or being sustained by them. These are all ways in which this 'as a whole' prevails around and through us, ways that lie beyond any taking up of positions and before all standpoints, ways that are independent of subjective reflection or psychological experience.

This indicates to begin with that this 'as a whole' is not tailored to any particular area nor even any particular species of beings. Rather this 'as a whole', the world, admits precisely the manifestness of manifold beings in various contexts of their being—other human beings, animals, plants, man-made things, artworks, i.e., everything we are capable of identifying as beings. This manifold, however, is poorly comprehended, or is not comprehended at all, if we take it merely as a colourful multiplicity of things at hand. If we only look at the particular domain of the animal realm, we already noticed there a pe-

Heidegger's David for David
analysis
β 347

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LETTER TO THE READER⁴²⁸

from
Frater Taciturnus

My dear reader, if you in any way are of my profession, you will immediately perceive that the character conjured up here is a demoniac character in the direction of the religious—that is, tending toward it.⁴²⁹ How honestly, how amply he does his part by talking so that you can see him (*loquere ut videam*) [speak so that I may see],⁴³⁰ no one knows better than I, who, often exhausted, often wearied, have been tempted to abandon him and to give up patience, which amount to the same thing, which is also why, by heeding the stars and by reading coffee grounds by virtue of my scaldic vision and eagle eye,⁴³¹ I pronounce the matchless prophecy that two-thirds of the book's few readers will quit before they are halfway through, which can also be expressed in this way—out of boredom they will stop reading and throw the book away. Since he is standing on a dialectical pinnacle, one must be able to calculate with infinitely small numbers if one wants to observe him. For a round sum, be it ever so large if it nevertheless is round, one does not buy admission to his dialectical performances, and thus one would be better off not finding it worth the trouble to observe such a puppet.⁴³² Yet it may well have its importance to pay attention to him, because one is able to study the normal in the aberration and, if nothing else, always learn this much, that the religious is not something to make light of as something one can easily do, or something for stupid people and unshaven striplings, since it is the most difficult of all, even though absolutely accessible and absolutely enough for everyone, which is already difficult to understand, just like the contradiction that the same water in the same place is so shall-

low that a sheep can wade and so deep that an elephant can swim.

The girl I have kept altogether ordinary (in particular have only had her lack religious presuppositions) and deliberately so, in order that she can better illuminate him and teach him to exert himself. It would take frightful effort, perhaps even be impossible, to raise a very small object with a hydraulic jack, or to weigh half a pound with a quarter-ton steelyard: and likewise I have also thought that if there has to be a misunderstanding, it had better be of some use.

⁴³³The erotic and the erotic relationship, however, are of minor concern to me. I use it mainly for orientation in the religious, so one does not become all confused and think that the religious is the first spontaneity,⁴³⁴ the first immediacy, or a little bit of this and that: drives and natural impulses and youthfulness, in which with an admixture of a little spirit there is a bit of fermentation. —The girl is what one properly calls a nice girl.* In novels and plays, and actually not until the

* The female character, of course, is only suggested in general outlines: a very young, lovable girl within the esthetic scope of naïveté. I shall sketch her here, since otherwise she is not discussed in her totality. I continually have him *in mente*, respecting, of course, the psychological probability that she does not emerge from her esthetic naïveté.⁴³⁵ In the period of the engagement she is reserved at first. His singularity and unerotic behavior were certainly bound to make a girl feel strange. She cannot bear it, becomes bored with it, wrinkles her nose, and puts her foot down. Then comes a little incident, and she relents; she places the chair beside her and bids him sit down while she charmingly in the most endearingly roguish manner does a little fall on her knees. But he, a miserable hero as a lover, he cannot understand this, and in no situation does he more resemble *qua* lover the immortal knight of the rueful countenance than when he is seated this way. Now he wants to leave her. In her agony, she beseeches him by God and everything holy that she can think of. She herself brings the note to him; she does not suspect that there could be anything wrong in that. Now the final struggle of separating begins. She manifests all her lovable sympathy, which is ready to be satisfied with any condition, and this is the endearing sympathetic resignation naïveté. She cannot express herself in any other way, and even if one were inconsistently to demand an indication of reflection's resignation, his deception and his desperate conduct in the deception completely prevent any genesis or expression of a reflective sympathy. Thus she is altogether charming, but nevertheless with only enough resilience, if it could be measured, so that there is the psycholog-

Stadier paa Livets Vei.

Studier af Forskiellige.



Sammenbragte, befordrede til Trykken og udgivne

af

Hilarius Bogbinder.



Kjøbenhavn.

Hos Universitetsboghandler C. A. Reigel.

Trykt i Bianco Lunos Bogstrykkeri.

1845.

STAGES ON LIFE'S WAY.

Studies by Various Persons.

Compiled, forwarded to the press and published

by

Hilarius Bookbinder.



Copenhagen.

Available at University Bookseller C. A. Reitzel's.

Printed by Bianco Luno Press.

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especially when the presupposed understanding still operates in the common knowledge of human being and world? But according to the most elementary rules of logic, the *circle* is a *circulus vitiosus*. If this is so then the business of historical interpretation is thus banned *a priori* from the realm of rigorous knowledge. If the fact of the circle in understanding is not eliminated, historiography must be content with less rigorous possibilities of knowledge. It is permitted to compensate for this defect to some extent with the "spiritual significance" of its "objects." But even according to the opinion of historiographers themselves, it would be more ideal if the circle could be avoided and if there were the hope of finally creating a historiography which is as independent of the standpoint of the observer as the knowledge of nature is supposed to be.

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But to see a vitiosum in this circle and to look for ways to avoid it, even to "feel" that it is an inevitable imperfection, is to misunderstand understanding from the ground up. It is not a matter of assimilating understanding and interpretation to a particular ideal of knowledge which is itself only a degeneration of understanding that has strayed into the legitimate task of grasping of what is objectively present in its essential unintelligibility. Rather, the fulfillment of the fundamental conditions of possible interpretation lies in not failing to recognize beforehand the essential conditions of the task. What is decisive is not to get out of the circle, but to get into it in the right way. This circle of understanding is not a circle in which any random kind of knowledge operates, but it is rather the expression of the existential *fore-structure* of Dasein itself. The circle must not be degraded to a *vitiosum*, not even to a tolerated one. A positive possibility of the most primordial knowledge is hidden in it which, however, is only grasped in a genuine way when interpretation has understood that its first, constant, and last task is not to let fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception be given to it by chance ideas and popular conceptions, but to secure the scientific theme by developing these in terms of the things themselves. Because, in accordance with its existential meaning, understanding is the potentiality for being of Dasein itself, the ontological presuppositions of historical [historischer] knowledge transcend in principle the idea of the rigor of the most exact sciences. Mathematics is not more exact than history, but only narrower with regard to the scope of the existential foundations relevant to it.

The "circle" in understanding belongs to the structure of meaning, and this phenomenon is rooted in the existential constitution of Dasein, that is, in interpretive understanding. Beings which, as being-in-the-world, are concerned about their being itself* have an ontologi-

* This "its being itself" is, however, intrinsically determined by the understanding of being, that is, by standing within the clearing of presence, where neither the clearing as such nor presence as such becomes thematic for representational thinking.

cal structure of the circle. However, if we note that the "circle" belongs ontologically to a kind of being of objective presence (subsistence), we shall in general have to avoid characterizing something like Dasein ontologically in terms of this phenomenon.

§ 33. Statement [Aussage] as a Derivative Mode of Interpretation

All interpretation is grounded in understanding. What is articulated as such in interpretation and is prefigured as articulable in understanding in general is meaning. Since the statement (the "judgment") is based on understanding and represents a derivative form of interpretation, it also "has" a meaning. Meaning, however, cannot be defined as what occurs "in" a judgment along with the act of judgment. The explicit analysis of the statement has several goals in our context.

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On the one hand, we can demonstrate in the statement in what way the structure of the "as," which is constitutive for understanding and interpretation, can be modified. Understanding and interpretation thus come into sharper focus. Moreover, the analysis of the statement has a distinctive place in the fundamental-ontological problematic, because, in the decisive beginnings of ancient ontology, the *λόγος* functioned as the sole guide for the access to beings as they really are and for the determination of the being of beings. Finally, the statement has been regarded from ancient times as the primary and true "locus" of truth. This phenomenon is so intimately connected with the problem of being that our inquiry necessarily runs into the problem of truth as it proceeds; it already lies within the dimension of that problem, although not explicitly. The analysis of the statement should help prepare the way for this problematic.

In what follows we shall assign to the term *statement* three significations which are drawn from the phenomenon thus characterized. They are interconnected and delineate in their unity the full structure of the statement.

1. Primarily, statement means *pointing out* [Aufzeigung]. With this we adhere to the primordial meaning of *λόγος* as *ἀπόφανσις*: to let beings be seen from themselves. In the statement, "the hammer is too heavy," what is discovered for sight is not a "meaning," but a being in the mode of its being at hand. Even when this being is not near enough to be grasped and "seen," pointing out designates the being itself, not a mere representation of it, neither something "merely represented" nor even a psychical condition of the speaker, his representing of this being.

2. Statement is tantamount to *predication*. A "predicate" is "stated" about a "subject," the latter is *determined* by the former. What is stated in this signification of statement is not the predicate, but the "hammer

tion can force those beings into concepts to which they are opposed in accordance with their kind of being. The interpretation has always already decided, finally or provisionally, upon a definite conceptuality; it is grounded in a *fore-conception* [Vorgriff].

The interpretation of something as something is essentially grounded in fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception. Interpretation is never a *presuppositionless grasping of something previously given*. When a specific instance of interpretation (in the sense of a precise textual interpretation) appeals to what "is there" ["dasteht"], then that which initially "is there" is nothing other than the *self-evident, undiscussed prejudice* [Vormeinung] of the interpreter which necessarily lies in every interpretive approach as that which is already "posited" with interpretation in general, namely, that which is *pre-given* [vorgegeben] in fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception.

How are we to conceive the character of this "fore"? Have we done this when we formally say "*a priori*"? Why is this structure appropriate to understanding, which we have characterized as a fundamental existential of Dasein? How is the structure of the "as" which belongs to what is interpreted as such related to the fore-structure? This phenomenon is obviously not to be dissolved "into pieces." But is a primordial analytic to be ruled out? Should we accept such phenomena as "finalities"? Then the question would remain, why? Or do the fore-structure of understanding and the as-structure of interpretation show an existential-ontological connection with the phenomenon of project? And does this phenomenon refer back to a primordial constitution of being of Dasein?

Before answering these questions, for which the preparation up to this point is not at all sufficient, we must inquire whether what is visible as the fore-structure of understanding and the as-structure of interpretation does not itself already represent a unitary phenomenon which has been used extensively in philosophical problematics, without what is used so universally measuring up to the primordially of ontological explication.

In the projecting of understanding, beings are disclosed in their possibility. The character of possibility always corresponds to the kind of being of the beings understood. Innerworldly beings in general are projected upon the world, that is, upon a totality of significance in whose referential relations taking care, as being-in-the-world, has rooted itself from the beginning. When innerworldly beings are discovered along with the being of Dasein, that is, when they become intelligible, we say that they have *meaning* [Sinn]. But strictly speaking, what is understood is not the meaning, but beings [Seiende], or being [Sein]. Meaning is that wherein the intelligibility of something maintains itself. That which can be articulated in disclosure that understands we

call meaning. The *concept of meaning* includes the formal framework of what necessarily belongs to what interpretation that understands articulates. *Meaning, structured by fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception, is the upon which of the project in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something*. Insofar as understanding and interpretation constitute the existential constitution of the being of the there, meaning must be conceived as the formal, existential framework of the disclosedness belonging to understanding. Meaning is an existential of Dasein, not a property that is attached to beings, which lies "behind" them or floats somewhere as a "realm between." Only Dasein "has" meaning in that the disclosedness of being-in-the-world can be "fulfilled" through the beings discoverable in it. *Thus only Dasein can be meaningful or meaningless*. This means: its own being and the beings disclosed with that being can be appropriated in an understanding [Verständnis] or they can be confined to incomprehensibility [Unverständnis].

This interpretation of the concept of "meaning" is fundamentally ontological-existential. If we adhere to it, then all beings whose mode of being is unlike Dasein must be understood as *unmeaningful* [unsinniges], as essentially bare of meaning as such. "*Unmeaningful*" does not mean here a value judgment, but expresses an ontological determination. *And only what is unmeaningful can be absurd* [widersinnig]. Objectively present things encountered in Dasein can, so to speak, assault its being [Sein]; for example, events of nature which break in on us and destroy us.

And when we ask about the meaning of being, our inquiry does not become profound and does not brood on anything which stands behind being, but questions being itself in so far as it stands within the intelligibility of Dasein. The meaning of being can never be contrasted with beings or with being as the supporting "ground" of beings, for "ground" is only accessible as meaning, even if that meaning itself is an abyss [Abgrund] of meaninglessness.

As the disclosedness of the there, understanding always concerns the whole of being-in-the-world. In every understanding of world, existence is also understood, and vice versa. Furthermore, every interpretation operates within the fore-structure which we characterized. Every interpretation which is to contribute some understanding must already have understood what is to be interpreted. This fact has always already been noticed, even if only in the realm of derivative ways of understanding and interpretation, in philological interpretation. The latter belongs to the scope of scientific cognition. Such cognition demands the rigor of demonstration giving reasons. Scientific proof must not already presuppose what its task is to found. But if interpretation always already has to operate within what is understood and nurture itself from this, how should it then produce scientific results without going in a circle,

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which we call Dasein, as the potentiality-of-being that is concerned to be this being. Dasein understands itself as being-in-the-world, although without sufficient ontological definiteness. Thus existing, it encounters beings of the kind of being of things at hand and objectively present. No matter how far removed from an ontological concept the distinction between existence and reality may be, even if Dasein initially understands existence as reality, Dasein is not just objectively present, but has always already understood itself, however mythical or magical its interpretations may be. For otherwise, Dasein would not "live" in a myth and would not take heed of its magic in rites and cults. The idea of existence which we have posited gives us an outline of the formal structure of the understanding of Dasein in general, and does so in a way that is not binding from an existentiell point of view.

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Under the guidance of this idea the preparatory analysis of the everydayness nearest to us has been carried out as far as a first conceptual definition of care. This phenomenon enabled us to get a more precise grasp of existence and of the relations to facticity and falling prey belonging to it. The definition of the structure of care has given us a basis on which to distinguish ontologically between existence and reality for the first time.⁶ This led to the thesis: the substance of human being is existence.⁷

But even this formal idea of existence, which is not binding in an existentiell way, already contains a definite though unprofiled ontological "content" that "presupposes" an idea of being in general—just like the idea of reality contrasted with it. Only in the horizon of *that* idea of being can the distinction between existence and reality be made. After all, both mean *being* [Sein].

But is not the ontologically clarified idea of being in general first to be attained by working out the understanding of being that belongs to Dasein? However, this understanding can be grasped primordially only on the basis of a primordial interpretation of Dasein guided by the idea of existence. Does it not thus finally become evident that this problem of fundamental ontology that we have set forth is moving in a "circle"?

We already showed, in the structure of understanding in general, that what is criticized with the inappropriate expression "circle" belongs to the essence and the distinctiveness of understanding itself.⁸ Still, our inquiry must now return explicitly to this "circular" argument if the problematic of fundamental ontology is to have its hermeneutical situation clarified. When it is objected that the existential interpretation is "circular," it is said that the idea of existence and of

6. Cf. § 43.

7. Cf. §§ 44 and 26.

8. Cf. § 32.

being in general is "presupposed," and that Dasein gets interpreted "according to this" presupposition so that the idea of being may be obtained from it. But what does "presupposing" mean? In positing the idea of existence, do we also posit some proposition from which we can deduce further propositions about the being of Dasein according to the formal rules of consistency? Or does this pre-supposing have the character of a projection that understands in such a way that the interpretation from which this understanding is formed lets what is to be interpreted be put in words for the very first time, so that it may decide of its own accord whether, as this being [Seiende], it will provide the constitution of being for which it has been disclosed in the projection with regard to its formal indication? Is there any other way that beings can put themselves into words with regard to their being at all? A "circle" in the proof cannot be "avoided" in the existential analytic, because that analytic is *not* proving anything according to the rules of the logic of consequence at all. What common sense wishes to get rid of by avoiding the "circle," believing that it does justice to the loftiest rigor of scientific investigation, is nothing less than the basic structure of care. Primordially constituted by care, Dasein is always already ahead of itself. Existing [seiend], it has always already projected itself upon definite possibilities of its existence, and in these existentiell projects it has also projected pre-ontologically something like existence and being. But can one deny this projecting of *that* research essential to Dasein, which like all research itself is a kind of being of disclosive Dasein, that wants to develop and conceptualize the understanding of being belonging to Dasein?

But the "charge of circularity" itself comes from a kind of being of Dasein. Something like projecting, especially ontological projecting, necessarily remains foreign for the common sense of our heedful absorption in the they because common sense barricades itself against it "in principle." Whether "theoretically" or "practically," common sense only takes care of beings that are in view of its circumspection. What is distinctive about common sense is that it believes that it experiences only "factual" beings in order to be able to rid itself of its understanding of being. It fails to recognize that beings can be "factually" experienced only when being has already been understood, even if this understanding is not conceptualized. Common sense misunderstands understanding. And for this reason it must also necessarily proclaim as "violent" anything lying beyond the scope of its understanding as well as any move in that direction.

Talk about the "circle" in understanding expresses the failure to recognize two things: (1) That understanding itself constitutes a basic kind of being of Dasein. (2) That this being [Sein] is constituted as care. To deny the circle, to make a secret of it, or even to wish to overcome it means to anchor this misunderstanding once and for all. Rather,

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our attempt must aim at leaping into this "circle" primordially and completely, so that even at the beginning of our analysis of Dasein we make sure that we have a complete view of the circular being of Dasein. Not too much, but too little is "presupposed" for the ontology of Dasein, if one "starts out with" a worldless I in order then to provide that I with an object and an ontologically groundless relation to that object. Our view is too short-sighted if we make "life" a problem and then occasionally take death into account too. The thematic objection is artificially and dogmatically cut out if one limits oneself "initially" to a "theoretical subject," in order to then complement it "on the practical side" with an additional "ethic."

This will suffice to clarify the existential meaning of the hermeneutical situation of a primordial analytic of Dasein. With the exposition of anticipatory resoluteness Dasein has been brought before us with regard to its authentic wholeness. The authenticity of the potentiality-of-being-a-self guarantees the fore-sight of primordial existentiality, and this assures us that we have coined the appropriate existential concepts.

At the same time, the analysis of anticipatory resoluteness led us to the phenomenon of primordial and authentic truth. Earlier we showed how the understanding of being that prevails initially and for the most part conceives being in the sense of objective presence and thus covers over⁹ the primordial phenomenon of truth. But if "there is" ["es gibt"] being only when truth "is," and if the understanding of being always varies according to the kind of truth, then primordial and authentic truth must guarantee the understanding of the being of Dasein and of being in general. The ontological "truth" of the existential analysis is developed on the basis of primordial, existentiell truth. Yet the latter does not necessarily need the former. The most primordial and basic existential truth, for which the problematic of fundamental ontology strives in preparing the question of being in general is the disclosure of the meaning of being of care. In order to reveal this meaning, we need to hold in readiness, undiminished, the full structural content of care.

§ 64. Care and Selfhood

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* Existence: (1) For the whole of the being [Sein] of Dasein; (2) only for "understanding."

9. Cf. § 44.

(a world) as being-together-with (innerworldly beings encountered). The totality of the structure of care does not first arise from a coupling together, yet it is articulated.¹⁰ In assessing this ontological result, we have had to estimate how well it satisfies¹¹ the requirements of a primordial interpretation of Dasein. We found that neither the whole of Dasein nor its authentic potentiality-of-being had been made thematic. However, the attempt to grasp phenomenally the whole of Dasein seemed to get stranded precisely on the structure of care. The ahead-of-itself presented itself as a not-yet. But the ahead-of-itself, characterized in the sense of something outstanding, revealed itself to our genuine existential reflection as being toward the end, something that every Dasein in the depths of its being is. We also made it clear that care summons Dasein to its ownmost potentiality-of-being in the call of conscience. Understanding the summons revealed itself—primordially understood—as anticipatory resoluteness, which includes an authentic potentiality-of-being-whole of Dasein. The structure of care does not speak against the possibility of being-whole, but is the condition of the possibility of such an existentiell potentiality-of-being. In the course of these analyses it became clear that the existential phenomena of death, conscience, and guilt are anchored in the phenomenon of care. The articulation of the wholeness of the structural whole has become still richer, and thus the existential question of the unity of this wholeness has become more urgent.

How are we to grasp this unity? How can Dasein exist as a unity in the ways and possibilities of its being that we mentioned? Evidently only in such a way that it itself is this being in its essential possibilities, that I am always* this being [Seiende]. The "I" seems to "hold together" the wholeness of the structural whole. The "I" and the "self" have been conceived for a long time in the "ontology" of this being as the supporting ground (substance or subject). Even in its preparatory characterization of everydayness, our analytic also already encountered the question of the who of Dasein. We found that Dasein is initially and for the most part not itself, but is lost in the they-self.[†] The they-self is an existentiell modification of the authentic self. The question of the ontological constitution of selfhood remained unanswered. It is true that we already fundamentally established the guidelines for the problem:¹² if the self belongs to the essential qualities of Dasein, whose

* Dasein itself is this being [Seiende].

† The "I" as what is in a sense "closest" in the foreground, and thus seemingly the self.

10. Cf. § 41.

11. Cf. § 45.

12. Cf. § 25.

Unconscious (sb. & adj.)

= *D.*: das Unbewusste; unbewusste. – *Es.*: inconsciente. – *Fr.*: inconscient. – *I.*: inconscio. – *P.*: inconsciente.

I. The adjective ‘unconscious’ is at times used to connote all those contents that are not present in the field of consciousness at a given moment; this is a ‘descriptive’, not a ‘topographical’, sense of the word, for no distinction is being made here between the respective contents of the preconscious and unconscious systems.

II. In its ‘topographical’ sense, the term ‘unconscious’ describes one of the systems defined by Freud in the context of his first theory of the psychological apparatus: this system comprises the repressed contents which have been denied access to the preconscious-conscious* system by the operation of repression* (primal repression* plus repression proper or ‘after-pressure’).

The essential characteristics of the unconscious as a system (*Ucs.*) may be enumerated as follows:

- a. Its ‘contents’ are ‘representatives’* of the instincts.
 - b. These contents are governed by the mechanisms specific to the primary process, especially by condensation* and displacement*.
 - c. Strongly cathected by instinctual energy, they seek to re-enter consciousness and resume activity (the return of the repressed*), but they can only gain access to the system *Pcs.-Cs.* in compromise-formations* after having undergone the distortions of the censorship*.
 - d. It is more especially childhood wishes that become fixated* in the unconscious.
- The abbreviation *Ucs.* (German *Ubw.* for *Unbewusst*) designates the unconscious in its substantival form as a system; *ucs.* (*ubw.*) is the shortened form of the adjectival ‘unconscious’ (*unbewusst*) wherever it is applied in the strict sense to qualify the contents of this system.

III. Within the framework of the second Freudian topography the term ‘unconscious’ is used above all in its adjectival form; indeed, no single agency can now hold a monopoly on its application, since not only the id but also parts of the ego and super-ego are described as unconscious. But it should be noted:

- a. That the characteristics attributed to the system *Ucs.* in the first topography fall *grosso modo* to the id in the second.
- b. That the difference between preconscious and unconscious, even though no longer based on a distinction *between* systems, nevertheless survives *within* systems, since the ego and super-ego are partly preconscious and partly unconscious.

If Freud’s discovery had to be summed up in a single word, that word would without doubt have to be ‘unconscious’. Consequently, given the limitations of the present work, we do not intend here to trace this discovery from its pre-

Freudian origins through its genesis and successive refinements in Freud shall instead restrict ourselves to underlining, in the interests of clarity, essential aspects which have often become obscure as a result of the term’s currency.

I. The Freudian unconscious is primarily—and indissolubly—a topographical and dynamic* notion formed on the basis of the experience of treatment. The experience showed that the psyche cannot be reduced to the conscious domain and that certain ‘contents’ only become accessible to consciousness after certain resistances have been overcome; it revealed that mental life is ‘full of active unconscious ideas’ and that ‘symptoms proceed from such ideas’ (1); and to the postulation of the existence of ‘separate psychical groups’, and generally to the recognition of the unconscious as a particular ‘psychical locality’ that must be pictured not as a second consciousness but as a system with its own contents, mechanisms and—perhaps—a specific ‘energy’.

II. What are these *contents*?

a. In his article on ‘The Unconscious’ (1915e), Freud calls them ‘instinctual representatives’*. The fact is that the instinct, lying as it does on the border between somatic and mental, precedes the opposition between conscious and unconscious. In the first place, it can never become an object of consciousness, and, secondly, it is only present in the unconscious through its representative* (chiefly the ‘ideational representative’*). We may add that one of Freud’s first theoretical models defines the psychological apparatus as a succession of inscriptions (*Niederschriften*) of signs (2)—a notion that is taken up and developed in his later writings. The unconscious ideas are organised into phantasmic imaginary scenarios to which the instinct becomes fixated and which may be conceived of as true *mises en scène* of desire* (see ‘Phantasy’).

b. Most Freudian texts prior to the second topography assimilate the unconscious and the repressed. This assimilation is not made without reservation, however: on more than one occasion Freud sets aside a place for contents which are acquired by the individual himself—phylogenetic contents which are held to constitute the ‘nucleus of the unconscious’ (3a).

This idea finds a finished form in the notion of primal phantasies*, understood as pre-individual schemata that inform the subject’s infantile sexual experiences (α).

c. Another traditionally recognised equation is that between the unconscious and the *infantile* in us, but here too a rider is needed. Not all infantile experiences are destined to become identical with the subject’s unconscious life just because they are lived through naturally in the mode described by phenomena as unreflective consciousness. For Freud, the first split between the unconscious and the system *Pcs.-Cs.* comes about through the action of infantile repression*. The Freudian unconscious is *constituted*—even if the first stage of repression (primal repression) may be considered mythical; it is not an undifferentiated form of experience.

III. It is well known that dreams provided Freud with his ‘royal road’ to the unconscious. The mechanisms which Freud showed to be at work in dreams (*The Interpretation of Dreams* [1900a]) and which constitute the *primary processes*—namely, displacement, condensation and symbolism*—are again encountered in other formations of the unconscious (parapraxes, etc.), which are equiva-

to symptoms by virtue of their structure of compromise and their function of 'wish-fulfilment'*

Seeking to define the unconscious as a system, Freud lists its specific characteristics as follows (3*b*): primary process (mobility of cathexes typical of free energy*); absence of negation, of doubt, of degrees of certitude; indifference to reality and exclusive subordination to the principle of pleasure and unpleasure (whose aim is the restitution, by the shortest available route, of perceptual identity*).

IV. Finally, Freud sought to anchor the specific cohesion of the system *Ucs.* and its fundamental distinction from the system *Pcs.* by introducing the economic notion of a 'cathectic energy'* peculiar to each system. The unconscious energy is supposed to apply to ideas that it cathects or decathects, while the transposition of an element from one system to another is effected by a withdrawal of cathexis on the part of the first and a recathexis on the part of the second system.

But this unconscious energy—and herein lies a difficulty of the Freudian view—appears at times as a force attracting the ideas and resisting their coming to consciousness (this situation obtains in the theory of repression, where the attraction exerted by the elements already repressed works hand in hand with repression by the higher system) (4); at other times, however, the unconscious appears instead as a force trying to make its 'derivatives'* emerge into consciousness—a force only contained thanks to the vigilance of the censorship (3*c*).

V. Topographical considerations must not blind us to that *dynamic* force of the unconscious so often stressed by Freud: on the contrary, topographical distinctions should be seen as the means of accounting for the conflict, for repetition and for resistances.

* * *

As we know, from 1920 onwards the Freudian theory of the psychical apparatus is subjected to a thoroughgoing revision: new topographical distinctions are introduced that no longer coincide with those between unconscious, pre-conscious and conscious. In fact, although the chief properties of the system *Ucs.* reappear in the agency of the id, the other agencies of ego and super-ego also have an unconscious origin and an unconscious portion ascribed to them (see 'Id', 'Ego', 'Super-Ego', 'Topography').

(*a*) Although Freud himself never connected primal phantasies (*Urphantasien*) with the hypothesis of primal repression (*Urverdrängung*), it is impossible to avoid noticing that they fulfil almost identical functions relative to the ultimate origin of the unconscious.

(1) FREUD, S. 'A Note on the Unconscious in Psycho-Analysis' (1912*g*), G.W., VIII, 433; S.E., XII, 262.

(2) Cf. FREUD, S., letter to Fliess dated December 6, 1896, *Anf.*, 185–86; S.E., I, 233.

(3) Cf. FREUD, S. 'The Unconscious' (1915*e*): a) G.W., X, 294; S.E., XIV, 195. b) G.W., X, 285–88; S.E., XIV, 186–89. c) G.W., X, 280; S.E., XIV, 181.

(4) Cf. FREUD, S. 'Repression' (1915*d*), G.W., X, 250–51; S.E., XIV, 148.

Undoing (what has been done)

D.: Ungeschehenmachen.—*Es.*: anulaci3n retroactiva.—*Fr.*: annulation r3troactive.—*I.*: rendere non accaduto or annullamento retroattivo.—*P.*: anulac3o retroativa.

Psychological mechanism whereby the subject makes an attempt to cause thoughts, words, gestures or actions not to have occurred; to this end he makes use of thought or behaviour having the opposite meaning.

We are concerned here with a compulsion of 'magical' aspect which is especially characteristic of obsessional neurosis.

Freud gives a cursory description of 'undoing' in the case-history of the 'Man' (1909*d*), where he analyses 'compulsive acts [...], in two successive stages, of which the second neutralises the first'. The 'true significance' of such acts 'lies in their being a representation of a conflict between two opposite impulses of approximately equal strength: and hitherto I have invariably found that this opposition has been one between love and hate' (1*a*).

In *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety* (1926*d*) Freud again spotlights this process, now giving it the name of 'Ungeschehenmachen': to make null and void. He looks upon it, along with isolation*, as the typical form of defence in obsessional neurosis, and he describes it as a magical procedure. He shows in particular how it is at work in the rituals of obsessional patients (2*a*).

Anna Freud lists undoing in her inventory of the ego's defence mechanisms (3), and it is generally so categorised in the psycho-analytic literature (4*a*).

It should be pointed out that the mechanism in question takes various forms. Sometimes an act is 'undone' by an opposite one (as when the Rat Man replaces a stone in the middle of the road after having earlier moved it to the side lest the carriage of his lady friend should run into it). At other times the same act is repeated but the meaning attached to it—whether conscious or unconscious—is the opposite one. Or again, the act of undoing may be contaminated by the act it is supposed to annul. These last two modes of undoing are illustrated by an example given by Fenichel (4*b*): a subject reproaches himself for having wasted money by buying a newspaper; he would like to undo his purchase by asking for his money back, but he dare not do so; he feels that to buy another paper would relieve him, but by this time the newsstand has closed, so finally he takes out a coin to the value of the paper and throws it to the ground. Freud refers to such sequences in terms of 'diphasic' symptoms: 'An action which carries out a certain injunction is immediately succeeded by another action which stops or undoes the first, even if it does not go quite so far as to carry out its opposite' (2*b*).

The classification of undoing among the ego's defence mechanisms also raises the question whether the 'second stage' involved is to be treated merely as a product of the defence. The variety of clinical instances of undoing rules out such a simple answer. Indeed instinctual motives are generally in evidence in both stages, particularly in the shape of the ambivalence* between love and hate; in some cases, in fact, it is the second stage that best displays the triumph of the instinct. In Fenichel's example the subject's entire behaviour indubitably constitutes a symptomatic whole.